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California previously held that section 834a applies only to arrest
situations.3 5 If the court's reasoning on "duty" can be slightly
extended, 3 a justified detention and examination would seem to
fall within the definition of "in the performance of his duty" for
a peace officer. If so, section 834a is unnecessary since resistance
in such circumstances would fall directly within the felony battery
portion of section 243 (assuming that the result of the resistance
is a battery). Another situation unresolved by Curtis is that in
which resistance to a lesser restraint, such as detention and
examination, could give rise to a more serious offense than
resistance to an unlawful arrest.
A very troublesome problem is recognized by the Curtis
Court but left unanswered. The rationale of section 834a as
applied to unlawful arrest is tenable only if the victim has an
adequate remedy at law. As the court admits, there is a remedy,
but in reality it is often more illusory than real.3 1 In an era when
individual rights are receiving special attention, the improbability
of pursuing this remedy to judgment is unfortunate. The Curtis
decision would appear to compensate to a limited extent for the
discrepancy between the existence of a remedy on one hand and
small chance of recovery on the other.
Louis N. SAUNDERS, JR.
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CHILDREN WHEN NOT DOING So WOULD RESULT IN AN
INEQUITABLE SITUATION. Moore v. Moore (Cal. App. 1969).

Jack Moore originally brought suit for divorce against his
wife, Helen. Following a cross-complaint by Helen, the parties
entered into a property settlement agreement. It was then
stipulated that the complaint, the answer to the complaint, and
the answer to the cross-complaint be withdrawn and default by
Jack Moore be entered. This agreement was approved by the court
in an interlocutory decree (July 23, 1962) and set forth in the
judgment. Custody of the children (two girls and one boy) was
35.

People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 221,430 P.2d 15, 26,60 Cal. Rptr. 457,468

(1967).
36.
37.

This may be contrary to the court's warning, supra.
70 Adv. Cal. at 366, 450 P.2d at 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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awarded to Helen, and Jack was ordered to pay $175 monthly for

support and maintenance of the children (August 15, 1963). Both
parties later remarried, and on November 21, 1967, a stipulation

was entered into by Jack and Helen in which it was agreed that
custody of the children be awarded to Jack and that he be relieved
of paying support for the children to Helen.

On February 16, 1968, Jack filed a declaration and requested
the mother be ordered to pay partial support and maintenance.,
The trial court found that the father's expenses for the two

children (the oldest child being married) residing with him were
in excess of $250 per month, and that his expenses for a new

residence for himself and the children would be $225 per month.
The court also found that the mother earned $380 per month take-

home pay and had the ability to contribute $80 per month toward
support of the children.2 The trial court then ordered the
stipulation of November 21 to be modified in that the mother

should pay to the father $40 per month, per child, commencing
April 1, 1968. 3 On appeal to the Appellate Court (Second

District), held, affirmed: the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering mother to contribute to partial support and
maintenance of the two children. Moore v. Moore, 274 Adv. Cal.
App. 760, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1969).
At early common law, the duty to support one's children was

considered merely a moral duty and not sufficient to bind the
father

However, this was considered repugnant to the sense of

justice and the great majority of American jurisdictions today
I. Jack claimed the following: 1) Their son was in Douglas, Wyoming, where he was
sent by Helen without Jack's consent. The son wanted to come home. This meant added
living quarters and expense. 2) A paper products company of the father had gone out of
business, thereby cutting off expected income. 3) The youngest daughter was about to
graduate from high school and desired to go to college. Moore v. Moore, 274 Adv. Cal.
App. 760, 762, 79 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294 (1969).
2. Helen's earnings were found to fall under Civil Code section 171c and were
therefore available for her separate obligations. 274 Adv. Cal. App. at 763, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 294-95.
3. "A child support drder can be modified where the parties have stipulated as to the
amounts of such support or when the decree is silent as to the amount of support." 274
Adv. Cal. App. at 765, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 396. Here, the stipulation was silent with reference
to the support of the children. Id. at 761,765, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 293, 296.
4. Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482, 487 (Ex. 1840); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H.
187 (1870); Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348 (1845). H. CLARK, DOMuSTIC RELATIONS § 15.1
at 488 (1968), suggested a conflict in the early American cases.
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hold the duty to be legal. 5 Two basic theories are used to
rationalize this duty.' First, it is correlative to and dependent upon
the parent's right to custody of the child; second, it springs from
the fact of parentage in that by bringing the child into the world,
parents have brought it upon themselves to support it.

Civil Code section 196 is California's version of the duty to
support minor chldren. 7 Section 139 governs its application since
section 139 gives the trial court the power to make suitable

allowances for the support of the minor children." The new Family
Law Act that will be effective January 1, 1970, in the State of
California, has not changed these sections.". Therefore, the case
law should virtually remain unchanged.

Under Civil Code section 196, the former rule was that the
parent was relieved of liability when "not in custody," absent a
court order."

Prior to 1923, penal sanctions were equated with

civil liability. Therefore, the rule was that a court order obligating
the parent "not in custody" (usually the father) was needed for
criminal liability." However, the Penal Code was amended in
1923 to hold the father criminally liable for the non-support of
his minor child regardless of who had custody of the child.12 This
resulted in the expansion of civil liability, which now corresponds
5. See J. SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 781 (6th ed. 1921), saying that this is
usually made so by statute; see also H. CLARK, DOMlESTIC RELATIONS § 15.1 at 488

(1968).
6. Few courts say what is definitely the basis, but this seems to be the underlying
reasoning. Extent of Parent'sDuty to Support, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 1072
(1950).
7. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 196 (West 1954) provides:

The parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support and
education suitable to his circumstances. If the support and education which
the father of a legitimate child is able to give are inadequate, the mother must
assist him to the extent of her ability.
8. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 139 (West 1969) provides:
In any interlocutory or final decree of divorce or in any final judgement or
decree in an action for separate maintenance, the court may compel the party
against whom the decree or judgment is granted . . . to make suitable
allowance for support, maintenance and education of the children of said
marriage during their minority. ...

9. No. 252, [1969] Cal. Senate Bill, Title 5, § 4700 (a) provides: "In any proceeding
where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order either or both
parents to pay any amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the
child."
10. In re Perry, 37 Cal. App. 189, 174 P. 105 (1918).
I I. B.ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 1098 (1953).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1955).
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with the amended penal sanctions.' 3 Therefore, it is no longer
necessary that the father be in custody or subject to a court order
before he is liable for support of his children.'4
Civil Code section 196 also provides that the mother must
assist the father in the support of their children if the father is
unable to do so. This part of section 196 was interpreted in Fox
v. Industrial Accident Commission," where the court suggested
that the primary obligation is on the father.'" This was further
defined in Stargell v. Stargell,"7 where the court stated:
[A]lthough the trial court has the power to require either the
father or mother or both to assist in the support of a legitimate
minor child, the civil liability for the supoort of a legitimate
child is imposed primarily on the father and only secondarily
on the mother.'"
This has been the traditional interpretation of section 196, and
also the general view in the United States. 9
The Moore court determined that no precedent exists which
specifically defines "when the father is or is not able to give
adequate support. 2 0 This introduced a new concept in the
interpretation of Civil Code section 196. The court then focused
upon the exact requirements to determine whether a father could
or could not fulfill his duty. The following test was given by the
court:
[I]t .

. .

is not an absolute test dependent upon whether the

husband has any resources at all to furnish adequate support
for his child, but a relative test in which the legitimate needs
of the child must be whittled down or expanded in accordance
with resources available from his parents. Their relative
13. 37 CAL. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child § 21 (1957).
14. Dixon v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 440, 14 P.2d 497 (1932).
15. 194 Cal. 173, 228 P. 38 (1924).
16. Id. at 179, 228 P. at 40. The court stated:
IT]he code sections quoted establish the proposition that, while the father is
expected primarily to support the minor children, the mother is not exempted
from this obligation. Where a father cannot fulfill the duty, the mother must
.... The existence of a legal duty resting upon the father does not free the
mother from her legal obligation; it is only performance of the duty by him
that excuses her. ...
17. 263 Cal. App. 2d 504, 69 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1968).
18. Id. at 510, 69 Cal. Rptr. at718.
19. H. CLARK, DoMESTic RELATIONS § 15.1 at 488 (1968).
20. 274 Adv. Cal. App. at 764, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
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contributions in turn must depend on the urgency of the needs
of the child and the relative hardship to each parent in
21

contributing to such needs.

The weighing of these variables is at the discretion of the trial
court and should not be upset unless there is an abuse of that

discretion.2 2 According to the trial court findings, 23 if Jack was to
use all his assets to support the children, he would have to

sacrifice possible future income which he could later apply to his
and the children's needs. It would also be necessary for the father

to sacrifice his own needs and pleasures to fulfill the expenses of
support and maintenance. On the other hand, since the mother
was remarried and employed, she had fewer financial problems.
She had income of $380 per month (take-home) and was well able
to contribute to the support of the children. Can it be said the

court erred in its decision? Clark has suggested; "If the wife is
able to contribute to the child's support and thereby enhance his

24
welfare, there is no reason why she should not be required to.
To summarize, section 196 is the California rule on the duty

to support minor children 25 and section 139 gives the trial court
the power to require the father or mother or both to assist in the

support of the minor children. 2 Thus, the trial court may use its
discretion in application of section 196.27 The Moore test

definitely limits this power. The trial court now has certain
guidelines to follow in exercising their discretion.2 8 In trying to

determine why the court created these guidelines, a glimpse into
past decisions is helpful. It seems that the decisions at the trial

court level were far from uniform.29 The lack of precise guidelines
21. Id. at 764, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 764-65, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
23. Id. at 765, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
24. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 15.1 at 496 (1968).
25. See note 8 supra.
26. See note 7 supra; Davis v. Davis, 68 Cal. 2d 290, 437 P.2d 502, 66 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1968); Brockmiller v. Brockmiller, 57 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625, 135 P.2d 184, 186 (1942).
27. 57 Cal. App. 2d at 625, 135 P.2d at 186.
28. 274 Adv. Cal. App. 764, 79 Cal. Rptr. 296.
29. The following cases exemplify the varying decisions: Hale v. Hale, 55 Cal. App.
2d 879, 132 P.2d 67 (1942). This was a very unusual situation where the mother and the
father both had abundant means. Custody being with the mother, the father was paying
$125 per month child support which the mother requested to be raised to $168 (since the
son was entering college). The court held it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse the
modification.
Brockmiller v. Brockmiller, 57 Cal. App. 2d 623, 135 P.2d 184 (1943). The father
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could have been a major factor in these inconsistencies. The prior
cases did not expressly say what factors the trial court was to

consider, but merely implied that the circumstances of each case
were adequate.3 0 Reversal as a matter of law was difficult on
appeal since the only grounds for such was an "abuse of
discretion" by the trial court.3 1 This being true, the decisions even
when seemingly inequitable remained untouched.32 A re-evaluation

of the facts by the appellate courts may have been an answer to
the need for greater consistency; however, this is not the law and

probably never will be since this would overburden the higher
courts with an influx of litigation. Therefore, the Moore court's
guidelines are a possible answer to this dilemma.
The implications of the Moore decision can be seen in light
of the trend towards equalization of the rights of parents.3 3 Prior
to 1923, there was a possibility that a father could not be held

liable for the support of his minor child.34 Since women at that
time lacked the rights and protection that they have today, 5 there

was a fear of such an inequitable result becoming a reality.36

Therefore, sanctions were imposed to hold the father liable under
had earnings of S130 per month of which $30 had to be paid for a lease. The mother,
who had custody of the child, had earnings in excess of $1400 a year. Cost to maintain
the child was $60 per month. The court, in holding that an award of $60 per month was
not an abuse of discretion, said: "NWemay not say as a matter of law that the trial court,
in placing the whole burden of supporting the children upon the husband, abused its
discretion merely because the wife is in receipt of a larger income than the husband." Id.
at 625, 135 P.2d at 186.
Sawyer v. Sawyer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 582, 134 P.2d 868 (1943). The mother, who was
in custody of the two children, earned $120 per month and her husband earned $160 per
month. The father of the children earned $237 per month. The court held that a $10 per
month child support decree was not an abuse of discretion. (This case shows an opposite
twist.)
30. Cases cited note 29 supra.
31. Brockmiller v. Brockmiller, 57 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625, 135 P.2d 184, 186 (1943).
32. Id.
33. 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 110, 112 (1953);see also note 9 supra.
34. The former rule was that the parent not in custody was not liable for the support
of the child absent a court order. In re Perry, 37 Cal. App. 189, 174 P. 105 (1918). Also,
it was at the trial court's discretion whether the father or mother or both would be required
to pay support for their minor child. Brockmiller v. Brockmiller, 57 Cal. App. 2d 623,
135 P.2d 184 (1943).
35. For a comprehensive development of women's rights, see: D. SMITH, JUSTICE IS
A WOMAN (1966); M. TURNER, WVoMEN AND VORK (1969).
36. The Moore case puts the shoe on the other foot. Now the courts are concerned
about the father who may be put into an inequitable situation when he has custody of the
child.
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any and all circumstances.37 As women's rights have increased, the

need for their protective blanket has diminished.-" However, there
still remains a tendency to give greater benefits to the mother in

alimony and child support decrees. It appears that the Moore
court devised its guidelines to help combat the possible inequitable
decisions that may have resulted. This may not be the panacea;

however, this result is a step toward uniformity of decisions and
is in line with the trend toward equilization of the rights of men
and women.
ROBERT Y. NAGATA

PAROLE-

EXCLUSIONARY RULES-

DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON
THE REHABILITATION OF PAROLEES NOT CONSIDERED IN HOLDING
THAT EXCLUSIONARY RULES HAVE No APPLICATION TO PAROLE

REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS.

In re Martinez (Cal. App. 1969).

While released on parole, Martinez was arrested, charged
witb and found guilty of possession of heroin.' The Court of
Appeal, Second District, subsequently reversed the conviction' on
the grounds that the search involved was illegal and the statements
used against him were obtained without constitutional warning.
The petitioner's parole had previously been revoked, 3 after a
hearing at which he was present, on the following grounds: (1) The

conviction (which was subsequently reversed); (2) driving a motor
vehicle without consent of his parole agent; and (3) using alcoholic
liquors to excess. Martinez's applications for parole were annually
heard and denied; the Adult Authority4 took cognizance of the
37. 37

CAL. JUR.
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2d, Parent and Child § 21 (1957); B. ARMSTRONG.

CALIFORNIA

1098.

38. Women today have the ability to provide for themselves, thereby lessening the
need for the husband's support. See, M. TURNER, WOMEN AND WORK (1964).
I. The record discloses that petitioner is now confined in Folsom State Prison, On
May 12, 1955, petitioner was convicted in the Los Angeles Superior Court of violation of
section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (sale of narcotics-heroin), sentenced and
committed to state prison. He had admitted a prior narcotics conviction. He was released
on parole on June 14, 1962. In February, 1963, he was arrested and charged with
possession of heroin. In October he was found guilty, sentenced to state prison and
committed to the California Department of Corrections, in whose custody he has
remained. In re Martinez, 275 Adv. Cal. App. 55, 57, 79 Cal. Rptr. 686, 687 (1969).
2. People v. Martinez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 796,43 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1965).
3. Petitioner's parole on the 1955 conviction was canceled November 15, 1963, and
formally revoked February 13, 1964. See note I supra.
4. Reference to the "Adult Authority" throughout this note refers specifically to
California's parole board.

